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Since Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 
CLR 177 it has been recognised that corporations with substantial market power 
are subject to special responsibilities and restraints that corporations without 
market power are not. In NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water 
Authority (2004) 219 CLR 90 McHugh A-CJ, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon 
JJ in their joint reasons stated (at [76]), that s 46 of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2012 (Cth) (CCA) can operate not only to prevent firms with 
substantial market power from doing prohibited things, but also compel them 
positively to do things they do not want to do. Their Honours also stated (at 
[126]) that the proposition that a private property owner who declines to permit 
competitors to use the property is immune from s 46 is “intrinsically unsound”. 
However, the circumstances in which a firm with substantial power must 
accommodate competitors, and private property rights give way to the public 
interest are uncertain.  
In the context of s 2 of the Sherman Act 1890 (US) Judge Posner noted in 
Olympia Equipment Leasing v Western Union Telegraph 797 F. 2d 370 (7th Cir. 
1986) that “it is clear that a firm with  lawful monopoly power has no general 
duty to help its competitors…” (at 375). However, the Supreme Court, in Aspen 
Skiing Co. v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 US 585 (1985) appears to have 
recognised some sort of duty to continue an existing business relationship with a 
competitor, in the absence of any efficiency-related reason for terminating the 
relationship. 
The purpose of this Note is to consider recent developments in two areas of the 
CCA where the law requires private property rights to give way to the public 
interest. First, is relation to s 46 of the CCA two recent cases shed light on the 
circumstances in which s 46 of the CCA can be used to compel a firm with 
substantial market power to accommodate a competitor and allow the 
competitor to make use of private property rights in the public interest. 
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Secondly, on 12 February 2014 the Minister for Small Business, the Hon Bruce 
Billson, released the Productivity Commission’s Final Report, on the National 
Access Regime in Pt IIIA of the CCA ( National Access Regime, Inquiry 
Report no. 66, Canberra). The Report recommends that Pt IIIA be retained but 
makes a number of suggestions for its reform, some of which will be briefly 
considered. 
Section 46: recent cases  
 
In the first case, ACCC v Cabcharge Australia Ltd (2010) ATPR 42-331, s 46 
was relied upon to force Cabcharge to accommodate a competitor, Travel Tab, 
by allowing Travel Tab to process Cabcharge cards on Travel Tab terminals. 
There were two relevant markets: first, the market for non-cash instruments for 
paying taxi fares, including Cabcharge cards (the Instruments market); and 
secondly, electronic payment systems market, including both manual and 
electronic payment processing systems, for processing the non-cash instruments 
(the Processing market). Cabcharge supplied both manual and electronic 
payment systems to taxi operators and drivers for processing taxi non-cash 
instruments. The manual system used dockets and cheque-like vouchers 
supplied by Cabcharge which were processed through credit card imprinters 
The electronic system used EFTPOS terminals supplied by Cabcharge. Its 
terminals were used in approximately 95 per cent of taxis, giving it substantial 
market power in the Processing market.  
Travel Tab was one of Cabcharge’s competitors. The company supplied 
electronic payment processing systems, but not manual processing systems.  It 
provided EFTPOS equipment to taxi drivers and imposed a 10 per cent service 
fee. In 2005, Mr Kesley, the manager of Travel Tab wrote to Cabcharge 
requesting permission to process Cabcharge Cards. Cabcharge’s company 
secretary, Ms Doyle, wrote back to Travel Tab requesting information from it 
including confidential information. Ms Doyle’s correspondence was held to be a 
constructive refusal to deal in the sense that Cabcharge was indifferent to 
whether or not Mr Kesley provided the information requested and Cabcharge 
was simply putting him off. 
In 2008, Mr Kesley again wrote to Ms Doyle requesting permission to process 
Cabcharge cards, and the request was again refused, Ms Doyle stating that “[i]t 
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would not be practical of  benefit to Cabcharge or taxi customers to engage in 
further discussion”. 
In 2009, the ACCC commenced proceedings in the Federal Court against 
Cabcharge. In 2010 Finkelstein J approved the settlement of the action between 
the ACCC and Cabcharge declaring that by refusing to allow a competing 
supplier of terminals to process Cabcharge cards, Cabcharge took advantage of 
its substantial power in the Instruments market to protect its position in the 
Processing market, contrary to s 46(1) of the CCA. Travel Tab’s terminals were 
capable of processing the information stored on the Cabcharge card. The 
purpose of the refusal was to ensure that Cabcharge’s processing system was the 
only system that processed Cabcharge cards electronically. Pecuniary penalties 
totalling $11 million were imposed in respect of the two refusals to deal with 
Travel Tab.  
The Cabcharge case was not fully argued. It was settled on the basis of an 
agreed statement of facts with Cabcharge admitting liability. As regards the 
source of Cabcharge’s market power in the Instruments market Finkelstein J 
stated (at [14]-[15]):  
“A significant reason for Cabcharge’s market power in the Instruments 
Market was its dominance in the Processing Market. It was important for 
Cabcharge’s competitors to have their taxi specific non-cash instruments 
accepted in as many taxis as possible; otherwise the usefulness of the 
instruments would be greatly diminished. By virtue of Cabcharge’s 
overwhelming market share in the Processing Market, it was critical for 
Cabcharge’s competitors to be able to have their instruments accepted 
and processed by Cabcharge’s payment processing systems. Cabcharge’s 
payment processing systems did not, however, accept any competitors’ 
instruments and consequently the vast majority of taxis did not accept 
non-cash instruments provided by Cabcharge’s competitors.  
Thus a person wishing to enter the Instruments Market would have to 
simultaneously enter the Processing Market. This represented a 
significant barrier to entry, given the significant sunk costs of entering the 
Processing Market. In addition, competitors would have needed to 
simultaneously convince consumers to accept their instruments and taxi 
drivers, operators and networks to adopt their payment processing 
systems. 
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It appears that Cabcharge’s financial resources generated in the Processing 
market were used to heighten a barrier to entry with rivals in the Instruments 
market being forced to enter the Processing market simultaneously, resulting in 
a structural change to the market and (possibly) conferring market power on 
Cabcharge.  
With respect to the “taking advantage” element of s 46(1), Finkelstein J held (at 
[32]): 
“By refusing to allow Travel Tab/MPos to process Cabcharge 
instruments, Cabcharge took advantage of the substantial degree of power 
it had in the Processing and Instruments Markets. Cabcharge’s refusals 
were for the purpose of preventing Travel Tab/MPos from processing 
Cabcharge instruments electronically and resulted in Cabcharge’s 
payment processing system remaining the only system that processed 
Cabcharge’s instruments electronically. Cabcharge would not and could 
not have engaged in this conduct if it were constrained by actual or 
potential competitors in the Processing and Instruments Markets.” 
Under competitive conditions, that is if there were other competitors, Cabcharge 
would have developed the appropriate interfaces that would allow Travel Tab to 
process Cabcharge cards on Travel Tab terminals. Otherwise it would risk 
losing business to those competitors. This was an application of the 
counterfactual test of the “taking advantage” element adopted by Mason CJ and 
Wilson J in Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd 
(1989) 167 CLR 177 at 192., that: “[i]f BHP lacked market power –in other 
words, if it were operating in a competitive market – it is highly unlikely that it 
would stand by, without any effort to compete, and allow the appellant to secure 
the supply of Y-bar from a competitor”.  
Cabcharge did not put forward any legitimate business justification for its 
refusal to deal with Travel Tab and allow it to process Cabcharge cards on its 
terminals. Finkelstein J observed (at [31]): 
“With respect to both refusals, Cabcharge acknowledges that although 
there would have been time and costs involved in developing appropriate 
interfaces, there was no technical reason that would prevent any 
electronic taxi-specific payment product from being processed by any 
EFTPOS terminal as long as that taxi-specific instrument and the relevant 
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EFTPOS terminals complied with all relevant banking/financial industry 
protocols, including security protocols.”  
The refusals were not intended to enhance economic efficiency, but were 
intended to exclude a rival. Consumer welfare would have been enhanced by 
allowing a greater number of taxi payment products to be processed by a greater 
number of terminals. 
 
In the second case, ACCC v Ticketek Pty Ltd, (2011) ATPR 42-385, Ticketek 
was forced to accommodate a competitor, Lasttix, by allowing it to use 
Ticketek’s website to sell Lasttix’s discounted tickets to the same live 
entertainment events for which Ticketek was promoting and selling tickets. 
This case was also settled on the basis of an agreed statement of facts. Ticketek 
admitted that it had substantial market power in the ticketing related services 
market during the relevant period. During the relevant period Ticketek held 
approximately 75 exclusive ticketing service agreements with venue operators 
and promoters around Australia for terms which ranged between three to five 
years. The venues included many of the major sporting, arena and concert 
venues, theatres and events in Australia. The existence of these exclusive 
agreements allowed Ticketek to prevent its competitors from providing 
ticketing related services at the venues covered by them. During the relevant 
period Ticketek’s approximate market share was 45 per cent calculated by the 
number of total tickets sold by Ticketek as a percentage of the total number of 
tickets sold for live entertainment events across Australia. 
Ticketek supplied many of its ticketing related services under ticketing service 
agreements using a system designed, owned and developed by Ticketek called 
“Softix”. The Softix Ticketing System allowed for the ticketing of events 
generally and for the setting up different price type categories of tickets for a 
particular event. Lasttix was a competitor of Ticketek. The promoters of various 
live events requested Ticketek to implement in its ticketing system a price type 
URL. The promoters provided these price type URLs to Lastix. When Ticketek 
became aware that Lasttix was publishing discounted ticket offers and was 
linking its website to the price type URLs which Ticketek had implemented for 
the promoter, Ticketek disabled the relevant price types.  
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Ticketek admitted that it took advantage of its substantial market power in the 
ticketing and related services market for the purpose of deterring or preventing 
Lasttix from engaging in competitive conduct in that market. Ticketek had 
refused to distribute tickets for Lasttix, a competitor in the market selling 
discount tickets to live entertainment events, where the Lasttix price was lower 
than the Ticketek price for the event being promoted.  
Bennett J declared that the refusal of the request to implement in its Ticketing 
System discounted price types to be published by Lasttix contravened s 46(1)(c) 
and was a taking advantage of Ticketek’s market power in the sense that the 
refusal was materially facilitated by its substantial market power. 
Ticketek had made a significant investment in building up a sophisticated 
Ticketing System with robust technology, such that its website and Softix 
ticketing system was akin to an essential facility. Lasttix needed access to its 
private property rights in order to compete with Ticketek in the market for 
discount tickets to live entertainment events. The refusals were not intended to 
enhance economic efficiency, but were intended to exclude Lasttix. Consumer 
welfare and the public interest prevailed over Ticketek’s private property rights 
in its Ticketing System. Pecuniary penalties totalling $2.5 million were imposed 
on Ticketek. 
The circumstances in which s 46 of the CCA can be used to compel a firm with 
substantial market power to accommodate a competitor have been considered in 
a number of other cases. In Dowling v Dalgety Australia Ltd, (1992) 34 FCR 
109), Mr Dowling sought access to the respondents’ saleyards which were 
jointly owned and operated by means of an unincorporated joint venture 
between three pastoral houses, to conduct auction sales. There was an 
agreement between the three pastoral houses that no other agents wold be 
permitted to use the saleyards. Mr Dowling argued that by refusing to allow him 
to conduct auctions sales on their premises, the respondents had taken 
advantage of their market power contrary to s 46. 
In the circumstances of that case, Lockhart J held that the respondents were not 
obliged to accommodate Mr Dowling and allow him to make use of their 
private property rights. His Honour found (at 145): 
“The conduct of the respondents in choosing to exercise their rights the 
way they did could not be said to be conduct that they would be unlikely 
to engage in or could not afford for commercial reasons to engage in, if 
7 | P a g e  
 
they were operating in a competitive market (I have assumed for this 
purpose that they were not). The respondents have not used or taken 
advantage of market power…They have declined to make available to Mr 
Dowling a valuable asset of theirs to advantage him as a competitor. In 
my opinion, they have not taken advantage of their market power for a 
substantial purpose of deterring or preventing Mr Dowling from engaging 
in competitive conduct in the relevant market.” 
Subsequently, in the NT Power case, PAWA contended that Dowling v Dalgety 
Australia Ltd is authority for the proposition that the owner of infrastructure 
assets can decline to consent to the use of their private property rights by others. 
The High Court majority in the NT Power case stated ( at [126]): 
“…Dowling v Dalgety Australia Ltd is not authority for any general 
proposition that a property owner who declines to permit competitors to 
use the property is immune from s 46. That proposition is, in any event, 
intrinsically unsound”. 
In that case the High Court ordered PAWA to accommodate a competitor, NT 
Power, by taking its electricity, receiving it into PAWA’s system and manage 
its transmission and distribution to enable NT Power to supply customers its 
customer in Darwin. 
The circumstances in which a court is likely to order that services be provided 
by the owner of property or infrastructure are similar to those under the 
essential facilities doctrine in the US ( see the four part test articulated by the 
Seventh Circuit in MCI Communications Corp v AT&T, 708 F. 2d 1081(7th Cir. 
1983) at 1132-33). The requirements that must be proved by an applicant to 
establish a contravention of s 46 are set out below. 
 The respondent must have substantial market power arising from 
ownership of private property, infrastructure or technology. 
 The property must be essential in the sense that the applicant needs access 
to it in order to compete with the respondent. 
 The respondent owner of the property and the applicant must be actual or 
potential competitors in a market that requires access to services provided 
by the facility. 
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 There must be a taking advantage of market power in the sense that by 
virtue of the respondent’s control of the market for the supply of the 
relevant services, and the absence of other suppliers, the respondent can 
withhold access to the property, and if the respondent had been operating 
in a competitive market, it would have been unlikely to stand by and 
allow a competitor to supply the services. 
 The respondent cannot provide a legitimate business justification for the 
refusal to provide access to the property, for example there is no spare 
capacity or it is not technically feasible to supply the services. 
 In refusing to supply the applicant, the respondent’s purpose is to exclude 
the applicant from a market in which the respondent competes.  
 The applicant must be prepared to pay a reasonable price for the services. 
Section 46 can be used to compel the owner of intellectual property to grant a 
licence of it to a competitor if the above requirements are met. In other words, 
intellectual property itself can be an essential facility. The High Court in the NT 
Power case, (at [125]) explicitly recognised that “intellectual property rights are 
often a very clear source of market power”. The High Court noted in the NT 
Power case (at [85]): 
“The legislative scheme contemplates that whether the conduct is refusal 
to supply intellectual property, or the supply of it on particular conditions, 
s 46 can be attracted. The fact that s 46 can apply to intellectual property 
rights, and hence the market power  can give, suggest that it can apply to 
the use of market power derived from other property rights not 
specifically mentioned in the Act. It follows that, provided the 
notoriously difficult task of satisfying the criteria of liability can be 
carried out, s 46 can be used to create access regimes…”  
The European Court of Justice in the Magill case (Joined cases C-241/91 P and 
C-241/91 P, RTE and ITP v EC Commission [1995] ECR 1-743) found that 
television guides subject to copyright were an essential facility. In that case, 
three television broadcasters who owned the copyright in their own television 
guides were forced to accommodate a new entrant to the market for television 
guides, Magill, by granting a copyright licence to Magill. 
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In the United States there has been a move away from the essential facilities 
doctrine because it provides a disincentive for investment in new infrastructure. 
Scalia J who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in Verizon 
Communications v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, (540 US 398 , at [3]) 
observed: 
“Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing infrastructure 
that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. 
Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in 
some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it 
may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to 
invest in economically beneficial facilities”. 
Productivity Commission: Recommendations for the Reform of Pt IIIA 
The underlying rationale for having mandatory access regimes such as Pt IIIA 
and Pt XIC of the CCA was considered  by the Productivity Commission in its 
National Access Regime report..  
The Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act 2006 (Cth) 
inserted a new objects clause. This was  intended to increase certainty for 
investors by requiring decision-makers to have regard to the objects clause. 
Section 44AA provides that the objects of Pt IIIA are to: 
(a) promote the economically efficient operation of, use of and 
investment in the infrastructure by which services are 
provided, thereby promoting effective competition in upstream 
and downstream markets; and 
(b) provide a framework and guiding principles to encourage a 
consistent approach to a access regulation in each industry. 
 
These objects emphasise the need to create appropriate incentives for 
investment and innovation. The object in s 2 of the CCA is: “to enhance the 
welfare of Australian through the promotion of competition and fair trading and 
provision for consumer protection”. How does this object sit with the objects 
clause in s 44AA? How are the conflicting objects of efficient operation and use 
of infrastructure; the promotion of investment in infrastructure; and the 
promotion of competition and fair trading to be reconciled by the decision 
maker? Are they to be considered over the long term or the short term? None of 
this is made clear. Consumers will benefit in the short term if access is granted 
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and competition is promoted in dependent markets, but may suffer in the long 
term if mandating access discourages or delays new investment in 
infrastructure, or results in the construction of facilities with sub-optimal 
investment capacity.  
 
  
The Productivity Commission recommended three important changes to the 
declaration criteria in s 44G (to be considered by the NCC) and mirrored in s 
44H (to be considered by the designated Minister), which limit the scope of Pt 
IIIA to situations where the benefits of a material increase in competition in the 
dependent market will outweigh the costs of regulated access.  
First, s 44G(2) provides that the NCC cannot recommend declaration of the 
service unless it is satisfied of all of the following matters: 
(a) that access (or increased access) to the service would promote a 
material increase in competition in at least one market (whether 
or not in Australia), other than the market for the service; 
 
In relation to the decision of the Full Federal Court in Sydney Airport 
Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2006) 155 FCR 124 
(French, Finn and Allsop JJ), the Productivity Commission observed (National 
Access Regime, Inquiry Report no. 66, Canberra, 17): 
 
The decision lowered the hurdle for declaration by requiring a 
comparison of the state of competition without access (even though 
access was already provided to Virgin Blue) and the state of 
competition with access.  
 
The Federal Court’s interpretation of criterion (a) in the Virgin 
Blue case means the potential effect of access regulation on 
competition is overstated to the extent that any existing access 
arrangements promote competition in a dependent market. It has 
been argued that, using the Federal Court’s test, access to almost 
all natural monopoly infrastructure would satisfy criterion (a) — 
the criterion may be satisfied even where the market power of a 
service provider is constrained due to the countervailing market 
power of users, or where the provider has an incentive to provide 
access.  
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The Productivity Commission has recommended (National Access Regime, 
Inquiry Report no. 66, Canberra, 17-18.) that criterion (a) be amended to 
provide that access should not be granted unless regulated access through 
declaration would promote a material increase in competition in the  dependent 
market : 
The competition test should be amended so that it is only satisfied where 
access to an infrastructure service on reasonable terms and conditions 
through declaration (rather than access per se) would promote a material 
increase in competition in a dependent market. This amendment would 
confirm the NCC’s current interpretation of the criterion by requiring a 
comparison of the state of competition under the status quo against the 
state of competition where access is granted on reasonable terms and 
conditions. This competition test would not be satisfied where there is 
already effective competition in dependent markets. It would also not be 
satisfied where access is already granted to all third parties on reasonable 
terms and conditions, as declaration would not be expected to alter the 
terms and conditions of access. 
 
Secondly, s 44G(2) provides that the NCC cannot recommend declaration of the 
service unless it is satisfied of all of the following matters: 
(b) that it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another 
facility to provide the service 
 
The Productivity Commission recommended (National Access Regime, Inquiry 
Report no. 66, Canberra, 19) that criterion (b) be amended to incorporate 
expressly a natural monopoly test: 
 
Due to the shortcomings associated with the tests previously used to 
apply criterion (b), criterion (b) should be applied in a different manner 
than in the past. The Commission’s preferred approach to criterion (b) 
accounts for both the total demand in the market in which the 
infrastructure service is supplied, and the production costs incurred by 
infrastructure service providers from coordinating multiple users of 
infrastructure.  
Criterion (b) should be satisfied where total foreseeable market demand 
for the infrastructure service over the declaration period could be met at 
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least cost by the facility.  
Thirdly, the Productivity Commission recommended (National Access Regime, 
Inquiry Report no. 66, Canberra, 20-21) that criterion (f), the ‘public interest 
criterion’, be amended so that it positively requires the public interest to be 
promoted. Furthermore, it has recommended that:  
 
Assessments under criterion (f) should specifically include any 
effects on investment (positive and negative) in markets for 
infrastructure services and dependent markets, and the 
administrative and compliance costs that would arise due to 
declaration. This change would also require criterion (f) to be 
framed as a test that assesses factors that affect the public interest 
with and without declaration — comparable to the access–
declaration distinction associated with criterion (a) discussed 
above.  
In addition, the Productivity Commission has also recommended that s 44V be 
amended to clarify the ACCC’s power to direct extensions to the facility. 
Section  44V(2)(d) provides that the ACCC in its determination may require the 
provider to extend the facility, in the sense of construction to extend the 
geographical range of the facility. However, s 44W imposes some limitations on 
the ACCC’s power to order extensions. Section 44W (1)(d) provides that the 
ACCC must not make a determination that would result in a third party 
becoming the owner (or one of the owners) of any part of the facility, or of 
extensions of the facility, without the consent of a provider. Section 44W (1)(e) 
provides that the ACCC must not make a determination that would require the 
provider to bear some or all of the costs of extending the facility or maintaining 
extensions of the facility. 
 
In the Matter of Fortescue Metals Group Limited, the Tribunal had to consider 
whether the ACCC’s power in s 44V(2)(d) to extend the facility included the 
power to order an expansion of the facility, in the sense of construction to 
increase the capacity of an existing facility without increasing its geographical 
range. The Tribunal concluded ((2010) ACompT 2 at [723]), that the objects of 
Pt IIIA set out in s 44AA supported a power to order capacity expansions: 
 
The objective of promoting the efficient investment in infrastructure must 
be understood in light of Part IIIA’s concern with facilities which exhibit 
natural monopoly characteristics. That is, the only facilities to which the 
access regime may be applied are those whose output can, or when 
expanded will, satisfy market demand more efficiently than if provided 
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by more than one facility. It would be odd to hold that a facility displays 
natural monopoly characteristics and, at the same time, deny to the 
ACCC the power to compel the owner to increase the facility’s capacity 
so that it can in fact satisfy that demand. 
 
The Tribunal held ((2010) ACompT 2 at [730]) that the limitations regarding 
extensions in s 44W would also apply to expansions.  
 
The Productivity Commission has now recommended (National Access Regime, 
Inquiry Report no. 66, Canberra, 26 ) that Part IIIA should be amended to 
confirm that the ACCC’s legislative power to direct extensions also 




The High Court noted in the NT Power case (at [85]) that s46 can be used to 
create access regimes. The High Court also noted (at [86]): 
Finally, there is no contradiction in legislation which contains Pt 
IIIA and also contains ss 2B and 46. It is possible to imagine 
circumstances similar to those of the present case in which PAWA 
would not be vulnerable to a s 46 challenge, but would eventually 
have to provide access, either under an effective access regime 
devised by the Northern Territory or under a regime developed 
pursuant to Pt IIIA. Further, in cases where there is a contravention 
of s 46, it is possible that curial relief, sought speedily, might be 
obtained before completion of the somewhat elaborate arbitral, 
review and appellate procedures provided for in Pt IIIA. 
 
Whether s 46 should be used to create access regimes is a question that should 
be taken up in the “root and branch” review of the CCA announced by the 
Prime Minister and the Minister for Small Business on 4 December 2013. 
Section 44B of the CCA currently excludes intellectual property from the 
definition of a service that can be declared under Pt IIIA except to the extent 
that it is an integral but subsidiary part of  a service, so that there is only very 
limited compulsory access to intellectual property rights under Pt IIIA. There is 
clearly a role for s 46 to be used to order compulsory licences of intellectual 
property rights to prevent firms that have acquired market power through new 
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technologies or otherwise from engaging in prohibited conduct, using their 
market power to drive smaller players out of business and thereby 
disadvantaging consumers. However, as the United States Supreme Court noted 
in Trinko, compelling firms that have invested in infrastructure to share it with 
their competitors may lessen the incentive to invest in economically beneficial 
facilities.  
 
The Minister for Small Business has announced that the Government will delay 
responding to the Productivity Commission’s Review of Pt IIIA until the 
outcomes of the root and branch review are known. Economic regulation is 
more difficult than other forms of regulation, because it consists largely of 
creating incentives and disincentives for businesses to engage in certain 
conduct, and there is frequently insufficient economic data available to predict 
what the costs and benefits of particular policy options will be. At a time when 
old industries such as car manufacturing are disappearing from the Australian 
economy, the root and branch review committee will have to take great care that 
they do not create any additional disincentives for firms to invest in new 
industries. 
